I. INTRODUCTION
Two individuals, P and S, are engaged in the burglary of V1's house. They gain access by prying open the back door with a metal bar which P then continues to carry with him. When surprisingly they come across the householder, P fears that V1's cries for help will alarm the neighbours. To silence him, he hits V1 forcefully on the head * Lecturer, School of Law, University of Reading. My thanks to Andrew Ashworth and Nicola Lacey for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am also indebted to the members of the Oxford Criminal Law Discussion Group and my colleagues at Reading who gave valuable feedback when I presented some of my ideas to them. I am also grateful to the AHRC for funding the research which led to this article.
with the metal bar, realising that in doing so he is virtually certain to cause V1 serious harm. V1 dies of his injuries. 1 Later that day, P and S take part in a fight between rival gangs. While S expects a fist fight aimed at 'teaching' their rivals 'a lesson', he is aware that P, whom he now knows to be of a violent disposition, is still carrying the metal bar. As things become more heated, P uses the bar to hit V2 ferociously on the head. V2 dies.
There is little doubt that P has committed murder in both instances. He has caused the death of another person with the requisite mental state for murder: as was confirmed in Woollin, 2 murder does not require that the murderer act with intent to kill. It is sufficient that the act of killing was done with intent to inflict serious injury.
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But what about S? Is he also guilty of murder? On both occasions, P and S were jointly involved in a criminal venture (burglary, assault). They were associates in crime. However, on neither occasion had they set out to commit murder specifically. If murder had been on their minds, there would be little difficulty in holding them both to account for V1's and V2's deaths: P as the perpetrator and S as a secondary party on the basis of aiding and abetting contrary to s. 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (for S encouraged P to kill V1 and V2). 4 In the above examples things are different, however, in that the purpose crime (burglary, assault) differs from the one that P and S are now accused of (murder). In a deviation from their common plan or purpose (burglary, assault), P has killed another 4
Committee have recommended statutory reform as a matter of some urgency, 11 successive Justice Secretaries have expressed little enthusiasm for following this advice. 12 It therefore now seems rather unlikely that the doctrine will be reformed by statute, so that, if change is to happen, it is for the courts to bring this about. The
Supreme Court has just agreed to hear the appeal in the joint enterprise murder case of
Jogee. 13 The hearing will take place later this year and presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity fundamentally to review the law in this area. Against this backdrop, this article will explore whether the contentious features of the joint enterprise principle could be improved by way of common law development.
On one view, now dominant in the case law, 14 joint enterprise represents a distinct, judge-made form of liability for participants in crime which exists alongside aiding and abetting under s. 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 and joint perpetration. In other words, it is used as a principle of inculpation. I have argued elsewhere that, both as a matter of history and principle, it is preferable to regard it as a principle of exculpation, delineating the boundaries of liability for aiding and abetting and joint perpetration. 15 On either view, the threshold for liability as it is currently understood is very low in that the accomplice is convicted on the basis of foresight alone. In contrast to a co-perpetrator or 'ordinary' accessory (who aids, abets, counsels or procures P's crime), those charged under the doctrine of joint enterprise will not have actively participated in or assisted or encouraged the commission of P's crime B. If joint enterprise is an independent head of liability, it thus threatens to subvert the stricter requirements of the other two heads of liability (which require active involvement with intent and knowledge of the essentials of the crime). If it is not an independent head of liability, but forms part of aiding and abetting and co-perpetration, it waters down the requirements of these forms of participation. On either view, the doctrine of joint enterprise is problematic because it sets the threshold for conviction lower in the case of the killer's associate than in the case of the actual killer. 16 In other words, it is easier to prove murder against the person who just stood by and watched than the person who struck the fatal blow. The principle leads to particularly harsh results in the context of murder because of the mandatory life sentence for those who are convicted of this offence.
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In 2003, Antje Pedain suggested that a concept of endorsement might be helpful in understanding the conception of intention in the law of murder and presented a powerful argument that such an approach was already evident in Lord
Hailsham's speech in Hyam. 18 She argued that intention in its primary sense of purpose and in its secondary sense of foresight of a consequence as virtually certain, rather than being conceptually independent, have a common denominator in that they and aiding & abetting. Joint enterprise only comes into play to determine the scope of either head of liability. In this, it fulfils a necessary and important function. Ultimately, it is hoped that the suggested approach might produce fewer controversial convictions: the prosecution would need to persuade the jury that S acted with a particular blameworthy mind-set, in addition to having participated in crime A with foresight of the relevant risk, the commission of crime B. Since it seems unlikely that legislative reform of the law on participation-in-crime will be achieved any time soon, 30 the proposed modification of the mental element in joint criminal enterprise would have the additional benefit that it can be put into practice through evolution of the common law, as will be explained below.
This paper will first set out the current mens rea element in joint enterprise and briefly reiterate how it can lead to inconsistency, incoherence and injustice. The main part of the article puts forward the suggested alternative of focusing on S's attitude (endorsement) towards P's further crime as opposed to his mere foresight of that crime and explains why this would be preferable to the law as it stands. It considers possible objections to such a development and explains how these might be overcome. The paper concludes that in some of the seminal cases on joint enterprise the law has come surprisingly close to an endorsement-focussed approach which might therefore be adopted by the courts without legislative intervention. 38 An implied agreement between P and S to commit crime A seems to suffice. (1) Maybe he genuinely, albeit naively, believes that his presence might help to avoid the worst, in the sense that he trusts his being there might have a moderating influence on others, although he can foresee that there is still a (significant) risk that one of his associates may do V serious harm. In all these instances, he remains associated with the enterprise, and does so with the requisite level of foresight (of death as a possibility)
42 ; yet his attitude towards the harm foreseen differs markedly in the three scenarios:
(1) In the first instance, S remains involved precisely because he wants to reduce the likelihood that V is seriously hurt.
(2) In the second example, S is indifferent as to whether V is caused serious harm or not. (3) In the final scenario, S positively wants V to be seriously harmed.
People generally would think worse of S in scenario (2) than in scenario (1), and still worse in scenario (3). The intuitively recognised differences in attitude reflect differences in moral culpability, which, it is suggested, ought to translate to differences in criminal responsibility.
There may be cases in which the same evidence suggests both that S clearly foresaw the ensuing violence and that he was not 'okay' with it. They demonstrate particularly clearly that focusing on foresight alone cannot be correct. P and S agree to 'torch' some cars. P has a propensity for violence and usually carries a knife, as S knows, but using violence is not part of their plan. The two succeed in setting alight a
Mercedes and are in the process of 'torching' a BMW when a local resident, V, comes upon the scene and threatens to call the police. Fearing apprehension, P fatally stabs V. What impact on S's liability would the following alternative findings have?
(1) S was happy to come along even though he foresaw the risk that someone might get hurt.
(2) S only agreed to come along if P promised that no one would get hurt.
It is clear that there is more evidence of foresight in scenario (2) than in scenario (1).
At the same time, S's (moral) culpability is lower in the second case than in the first. This is because extracting the promise from P that no one will get hurt is good evidence not just of foresight (that P may hurt someone) but also of the attitude that S has towards the harm caused by P. In the second example, S does not want anyone to be harmed; in the first example, he is indifferent to harm being caused: S is 'happy' to come along, although he can foresee that P's propensity for violence might result in someone being injured. S's attitude (of 'so be it') towards the fatal outcome produced by P is blameworthy, not his foresight of the fatality as such (albeit coupled with the fact that he remains associated with P). The two cases illustrate a morally relevant distinction which the current law does not acknowledge: as soon as S foresees that P might kill with the requisite murderous intention, he is put on a par with P and becomes liable to a conviction for murder should P indeed kill with the requisite intention (i.e. with foresight of grievous bodily harm or death as a virtual certain consequence of his, P's, actions); 43 the alternative of a manslaughter conviction 44 is currently only relevant where S foresees violence on P's part, but does not expect him to harbour murderous intentions in the Woollin-sense. Assuming S does indeed contemplate that P might act with lethal mens rea in the two situations described above, the current law would allow a jury to convict him of murder in both instances. thing to find someone who was merely on the periphery of events and not actively involved guilty of murder in circumstances where he remained at the scene out of fear or intimidation.
III. FORESIGHT PLUS ENDORSEMENT?
Arguably the law on joint enterprise would be less controversial (and fewer cases might reach the appellate courts) if it allowed for more subtle distinctions to be drawn when it comes to S's mind-set. 54 This might be achieved if, in assessing the defendant's mental state, the focus shifted from foresight of the consequences some (pre-Powell) cases can be read as presaging an element of approval or endorsement as to P's conduct (which S has foreseen as a possible incident to their joint venture), while more recent ones are at least ambiguous on this point. Indeed, it is arguable that, in the same way that foresight (albeit in the degree of virtual 54 It might be objected that introducing greater subtleties into the jury direction will lead to more scope for appeals. However, ultimately this is an argument premised on an inherent lack of confidence in the jury system. The Law Commission has recently consistently proposed that more gradations of criminal culpability should be introduced. It could also be argued that the recent abundance of appeals from joint enterprise convictions is a function of a (possibly rightly) perceived mismatch between the crude test of foresight and the ordinary person's intuitive moral judgment. It might also be objected that differences in responsibility should be dealt with at the sentencing rather than conviction stage. This raises a more general issue of criminal law -why have gradations of responsibility reflected at the offence stage at all (eg murder versus manslaughter) rather than dealing with them at the sentencing stage?
55 On the significance of one's attitude to one's actions, see also e. . However, while Baker concludes that joint enterprise liability should not be established unless it is 'shown that the accessory intended the perpetrator to perpetrate the collateral crime (should the need for it arise) for the purpose of effecting their joint enterprise' and that historically, a jury could infer from S's foresight that S 'conditionally intended the collateral crimes that resulted from the unlawful joint enterprise', my view is that liability depended, and should again depend, on whether or not the accomplice has endorsed the perpetrator's collateral crime, with foresight being part of the evidential matrix from which such endorsement can be proved. 63 Arguably, the focus here is as much on foresight (= cognitive element) as it is on S's decision (= volitional element) to remain a participant in the common criminal endeavour, so that it would not be fair to say that S is held to account on the basis of his foresight alone. Rather, S may here be held to account for his decision to remain in the enterprise, a decision which is not just constitutive of a willingness to run the risk of a harm foreseen -in which case it would still be difficult to explain why that should be sufficient to constitute the mens rea for murder -but, arguably, is constitutive of S's reconciliation to such harm. Such an understanding would go beyond recklessness (in its traditional common law sense), and whilst not amounting to intention in the common law sense either, might at least bring S's responsibility closer to one for intentional conduct. Indeed, Lord Steyn himself seems to realise that his view is not all that well supported by authority, for he continues at length to justify the imposition of liability in Powell with reference to policy and practical considerations.
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Bearing in mind how the Privy Council in the above cases initially associated 'participation' with both 'authorisation' and 'acceptance', it might be argued that, notwithstanding the fact that the language of 'authorisation' was rejected in Powell (replacing it with 'contemplation', upon which the focus in modern cases shifted to foresight), the law on joint enterprise, in continuing to rely on the 'participating with foresight'-formula, still has at its core an element of volition. Ultimately S might thus be held to account because he has endorsed, as judged by his overall behaviour, the consequences foreseen by him as possible to result from his companion's actions.
The view put forward here is admittedly not easily reconciled with the two This is preferable to a link based on foresight alone, which, as explained above, does not provide a moral connection between S and crime B.
The second good reason for preferring an endorsement-based approach to the current law is that it would make the basis of S's conviction intellectually sounder, in that endorsement can actually explain why S is to be held responsible for what is essentially P's crime: by his endorsement of crime B, the scope of the enterprise (crime A) is extended, so that S now has participated in a venture that includes P's further wrongdoing. In other words, the joint enterprise to which S is a party consists of both crime A and crime B. Endorsement thus furnishes the vital criterion by which the jury can decide whether the killing formed part of P's and S's common plan or purpose, so that it can then, justifiably, be attributed to S. If, for instance, in my 'car torching gone wrong'-example, S had continued to set fire to other cars after P had killed the intervener, it would be possible for the jury to infer that he had thereby adopted P's act of killing. 83 In contrast, had S in the same situation exclaimed 'What are you doing?' in a voice of utter disbelief, this might be taken to indicate that he was not, in any sense of the word, 'okay' with what his companion, P, was doing, giving rise to an inference that he did not endorse the latter's actions, although it cannot be denied that, on the facts, he had foresight that P might do just such a thing, knowing as he did of the presence of the knife and P's violent disposition.
The endorsement approach can explain S's liability not just in joint enterprise scenarios (which, as we have seen, concern two crimes), but also in instances of 'ordinary' aiding & abetting 84 and co-perpetration (where only one crime will have been committed). Indeed, it is possible to argue that endorsement is the underlying principle of all of these forms of liability: it is required, at the very least as a necessary condition, in order to fix participants in crime with liability, be it because they encouraged another's crime, aided in its commission or actually contributed to it.
The approach advocated here thus, thirdly, supports the argument that joint enterprise is not a head of liability in its own right, 85 but a mechanism complementing and underlying the ordinary rules of aiding & abetting and co-perpetration, helping to determine how far to cast the net of liability.
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Fourthly, the endorsement test is to be preferred to one looking to mere foresight because it excludes from the reach of the joint enterprise doctrine the case Lord Mustill found impossible to accommodate within a principle of liability which puts S on a par with P, because S's culpability is 'at a lower level than the culpability of the principal who actually does the deed' 87 : 'S foresees that P may go too far; sincerely wishes that he will not, and makes this plain to P; and yet goes ahead (…).' 88 In excluding this case, the joint enterprise doctrine becomes more coherent. It also becomes more proportionate and just in its application. This may be particularly relevant in cases in which S feels pressured or coerced to remain with the group notwithstanding, or even because, he foresees that conflict may escalate into (greater or even lethal) violence. The law is very clear that duress is not a defence to murder.
An endorsement approach would solve this problem at the liability stage and might prevent serious injustice in such cases (by reducing S's liability to unlawful dangerous act manslaughter in appropriate cases, as will be explained below).
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Finally, all commentators seem to be agreed that the current test sets the hurdle for conviction too low, while there are fears that requiring intention would set the hurdle too high (in that it is impossible to prove in practice). Endorsement might provide a middle ground from which to work out a practicable solution.
If, as has been argued, 'participating with foresight' can be construed, or at least developed, so as to involve an element of volition (in the sense of endorsement of the foreseen harmful consequences), it would be preferable to have this articulated openly. As it is, juries struggle to make sense of the participation requirement, as evidenced, for example, by Stringer where the jury sent a note to the judge asking for 87 [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (HL) 11. clarification on what 'constituted participation as defined in his summing up'. 90 It is not obvious on an 'ordinary English meaning'-interpretation of 'participation' that this requirement might aim for a finding that the defendant endorsed P's crime: while 'participating' may imply that the defendant chose to run a risk, it does not without more invite the jury to draw more far-reaching inferences as to the defendant's disposition or volitional state of mind in the sense of an acceptance of or reconciliation to the harmful consequences of P's crime. As William Wilson has pointed out, albeit in the context of homicide law reform, 'a willingness to run risks is not the same as being reconciled to their outcome', 91 and it is the latter that, arguably, links S to P's crime B under the doctrine of joint enterprise, not the former (which seems ill-suited to bear the load of a murder conviction).
V. OBJECTIONS TO AN ENDORSEMENT-BASED MENS REA APPROACH
It might be objected that any reform along the lines suggested in this paper raises practical concerns, and in particular (1) that joint enterprise in its current form is needed to tackle gang violence effectively, (2) that the proposed change would deprive the prosecution of a bargaining chip vital in securing accomplice testimony and/or guilty pleas, and (3) that adding an element of endorsement would make jury instructions too complex. Let us take them one by one.
A. Fighting Gang Violence
Gang violence is a serious problem and one that requires a firm and effective response. Where a gang kills it may not always be easy to prove who fired the fatal shot, guided the fatal blade or landed the fatal blow. It would, however, be a mistake to tackle problems created by gang membership and escalating acts of violence committed en groupe by lowering the requirements of participation and accessorial liability. 93 Joint enterprise as it stands is a common law principle which as a matter of legal doctrine does not fit in well with the rest of the common law which normally insists that a defendant will only be punished according to his own moral culpability. Imposing a mandatory life sentence on a 'non-acting co-adventurer' 94 merely because he foresaw that somebody else might, in the course of a joint criminal act, commit a more serious crime also raises serious rule of law concerns, in particular as to whether such a defendant is given fair warning and whether his wrongdoing is fairly labelled. The issues are wellrehearsed, 95 and I do not want to repeat them here.
It is not at all obvious to me that the mens rea standard put forward in this paper, and designed to address the above concerns, would significantly weaken the foresaw at least some harm coming to the victim can be guilty of unlawful dangerous act manslaughter where P ends up killing V. 97 In most cases of gang violence the risk of escalation will already have been inherent in crime A. 98 The advantage of this approach is that the judge will be able to sentence S according to S's culpability rather than being compelled to pass a life sentence.
B. Depriving the Prosecution of a Bargaining Chip
Another objection that I have encountered in discussions is that the proposed approach would deprive the prosecution of a powerful weapon in plea bargaining and/or securing accomplice testimony. The idea is that the threat of being charged with joint enterprise murder is so powerful as to incentivise cooperation with the prosecution. However, the scope for guilty pleas under the current law is, perhaps, more limited than the general public would expect. First, given that murder carries a mandatory life sentence, there is little scope for reducing the time to be served in consideration of a defendant pleading guilty. As far as the minimum prison term is concerned, the starting points are set high (whole life, 30 years, 25 years, 15 years, 12 years, depending on a number of criteria set out in Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) and the maximum discount a defendant can expect in exchange for a guilty plea is one sixth of the minimum term. 99 Secondly, para 60 of the 2012 CPS Guidance on Joint Enterprise Charging Decisions appears to bar the prosecution from threatening a defendant with joint enterprise in order to secure his guilty plea on a lesser charge: 'Prosecutors should never go ahead with more charges than are necessary just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a few. In the same way, they should never go ahead with a more serious charge just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious one'. 100 While the Guidelines say nothing about securing accomplice testimony, there must be a serious question mark over the probative value of any accomplice testimony thus obtained. This view might be regarded as naïve and 'academic' by those actually operating the criminal justice system. It cannot be denied that the threat of being charged with joint enterprise, be it express or implied, may make it more likely that gang members will turn on other gang members. However, it is open to doubt that modifying the mental element the prosecution would be required to prove along the lines suggested would change this very much.
C. Complexity of Jury Instructions
One further obstacle to having an attitude-test of endorsement play a more prominent part in the mens rea of joint enterprise is the belief that the current foresight-centred approach alone is capable of keeping the mens rea inquiry in joint enterprise sufficiently simple, so that a jury comprised of non-lawyers can work with it. In Lord If a judge, in whatever terms exactly, directs the jury to interpret the 'participation' requirement in the suggested way, the majority of cases that are currently dealt with under the heading of joint enterprise could still be accommodated within the refined approach. 105 However, the basis of any conviction would be stronger -and intellectually sounder -in that the endorsement approach can explain why S is to be held responsible for P's crime: by his endorsement of crime B, the scope of the enterprise (crime A) is extended, so that S now has participated in a venture that includes P's further wrongdoing. In other words, the joint enterprise to which S is a party consists of both crime A and crime B.
105 Although in joint enterprise cases involving several defendants there usually is uncertain and/or contradictory evidence, in many appeal cases where a joint enterprise conviction has been upheld, the jury was assumed to have believed that the defendant's participation in the events went beyond mere presence at the scene with foresight. Evidence such as the defendant's chasing the victim down the road might (as seen against all the evidence) lead a jury to infer endorsement of the fatal consequences, see e.g. Rahman 
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise has been criticised as unjust, over-inclusive and lacking both in clarity and principle, first and foremost because it allows for S to be convicted for a murder which P alone has committed, on the strength of S's foresight of such crime as a possible incident to their joint criminal venture, when P himself can only be convicted for such offence if intention is proved. The foregoing discussion has suggested that the criticisms levelled against the doctrine and, in particular, its rather undemanding mens rea standard, may be alleviated if the mental element in joint enterprise focussed not just on S's foresight, but also on his attitude vis-à-vis the consequences foreseen. On the approach here advocated, the mens rea inquiry would take into account whether S in fact endorsed the fatal outcome produced by his associate, be this by way of positive approval or by having reconciled himself to the foreseen consequences for the sake of achieving another goal.
It has further been argued that, inasmuch as the prevalent mens rea requirement in joint enterprise is hard to pin down and leaves room for interpretation, such an approach might already be within interpretative reach of the common law.
The relevant starting point would be the well-established 'participation with foresight'-formula, the precise meaning of which remains, however, elusive: while it is commonly assumed that the mens rea standard in joint enterprise is common law recklessness, so that S is held liable -upon a finding of foresight and continued participation in the enterprise -for having chosen to run an unjustified risk of further wrongdoing by his associate in crime, P, the 'participation with foresight' element, as a requirement that goes to both actus reus and mens rea, seems to allow for a more far-reaching reading, which finds support in some pre-Powell case law. As such, the expression 'participating with foresight' might be construed (or developed) so as to presage a requirement that S, by continuing to be a participant in the enterprise, has not just assumed the risk of P's further wrongdoing, but has in fact endorsed P's additional crime. On such a construction (or development), the joint enterprise doctrine would hold S to account on the basis of more than foresight of a possibility:
S would ultimately be punished because he, in at least the weak sense of reconciliation, accepted the harm caused by his associate.
While it may not prove easy to formulate an endorsement-test for the jury to apply to a charge of joint enterprise, it has been suggested that juries can be trusted to understand the complexities of such an attitude-oriented approach to mens rea, in that it would require them to draw inferences, on all the evidence, in much the same way that people generally draw inferences about other people's feelings and mind-sets in everyday life, a task no harder to fulfil than determining what a person foresaw at any given time.
The suggested approach, in that it links S to P's further crime on the basis of S's endorsement of P's crime and its harmful consequences, would provide us with a more potent connection between S and P's action than the current foresight test.
Indeed, it has been briefly suggested that it may be an overarching principle which applies, as a necessary condition of liability, to all forms of secondary liability and coperpetration. At the same time, the endorsement approach would allow for an exclusion of cases where the doctrine, as commonly understood, appears overinclusive, i.e. cases where S is expressly opposed to P's further wrongdoing, but continues to be associated with the original enterprise. 106 It would also allow the jury 'moral elbow room' in cases where he remains at the scene because he is being coerced or because he fears reprisals from the other members of the group should he refuse to go along with them -a particular problem for the application of the current doctrine because there is not even a partial defence of duress to murder. Such secondary parties would not necessarily escape liability for homicide, however: it may well be possible to bring home a charge of dangerous unlawful act manslaughter on the basis that the jointly committed crime A inherently came with the risk of an escalation of violence. The suggested approach would thus lead to a narrowing of the scope of the joint enterprise doctrine, whilst putting it on a principled footing. 
